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Introduction
Recollecting one’s personal past (episodic memory) and construct-
ing imagined or future personal events (episodic simulation) share 
similar cognitive and neuronal underpinnings (Hassabis, et al., 
2007b; Schacter and Addis, 2007). In particular, both episodic 
memory and simulation are disrupted by bilateral damage to the 
hippocampus (Hassabis et al., 2007a, 2007b; Mullally et al., 2012). 
Such findings have underpinned the development of the scene con-
struction hypothesis (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009), in which intact 
hippocampal function is required to construct spatially coherent, 
navigable scenes which form the basis of episodic processes.
However, episodic simulation requires a larger network of 
structures, for example, the core network (Benoit and Schacter, 
2015) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (McCormick et al., 
2018) working in tandem with the hippocampus (Williams et al., 
2020). In addition, some patients with hippocampal damage and 
severe episodic memory impairments do not show parallel impair-
ments in episodic simulation (Hassabis et al., 2007b; Hurley et al., 
2011; Maguire et al., 2010), although for these patients, remnant 
hippocampal activation and semantic processes were sufficient to 
support performance on the episodic simulation task (Mullally 
et al., 2012, 2014). Therefore, these patients do not provide strong 
evidence against the importance of the hippocampus in scene con-
struction hypothesis. However, alongside the evidence for involve-
ment of regions beyond the hippocampus, they highlight the need 
to consider episodic simulation in patients with amnesia but with-
out hippocampal damage.
Rubin and Greenberg (1998) proposed that patients with asso-
ciative visual agnosia following damage to the visual association 
cortices may present with a unique form of amnesia termed vis-
ual memory deficit amnesia (VMDA). VMDA is characterised 
by severe retrograde episodic deficits (i.e. loss of memories that 
were formed before injury) alongside significantly less severe 
deficits in anterograde memory (i.e. memories formed following 
the injury). It was hypothesised that this reflects the reliance of 
episodic memory on visual and spatial imagery. Episodic memo-
ries formed before damage to the visual cortices suffer from the 
loss of their central visual elements and, moreover, this loss dis-
rupts the cascade of activation required to activate non-visual ele-
ments of the memory. This results in a severe and temporally 
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ungraded amnesia for memories formed before the injury. Those 
memories formed post-injury are less reliant on the visual ele-
ments and are therefore less disrupted. One example of a patient 
possessing VMDA is patient MS, reported by Greenberg et al. 
(2005).
Because VMDA patients do not show episodic memory loss 
as a direct result of damage to the hippocampus, it remains 
unclear whether such patients will present with deficits in epi-
sodic simulation. For instance, patient MS possesses remnant 
hippocampal tissue in the right hippocampus (Heywood et al., 
1991), similar to P01 (Mullally et al., 2012). Consequently, he 
might possess preserved episodic simulation abilities. However, 
given the loss of visual imagery in patient MS, a known compo-
nent of episodic simulation (Greenberg and Rubin, 2003), it is 
possible that even with such remnant tissue, deficits in episodic 
simulation might nonetheless occur. Consequently, examining 
episodic simulation in patient MS offers insight into the impor-
tance of visual imagery in episodic simulation.
Therefore, this study aimed to establish whether patient MS 
could perform episodic simulation. To account for the visual defi-
cits of patient MS, both visual and non-visual scenarios were 
used along with adaptions to self-report measures. As an older 
patient than many tested in such episodic simulation tasks to 
date, we compared patient MS’s performance with a healthy age-
ing control group and a young adult group to ensure that any 




Patient MS was a 66-year-old male with visual object agnosia 
and amnesia. His case history has been reported in depth else-
where (e.g. Greenberg et al., 2005; Kentridge et al., 2012). 
Briefly, at 23 years of age, patient MS suffered idiopathic herpes 
encephalitis causing left homonymous hemianopia, achromatop-
sia, visual object agnosia and a severe anterograde episodic 
memory loss. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans identi-
fied that the left occipital lobe was spared, but with some atypical 
signalling among white matter for infra-and-supracalcarine 
regions. In contrast, the right occipital lobe was extensively dam-
aged, including the occipitotemporal junction. For the left tempo-
ral lobe, there was complete loss of the temporal pole, 
parahippocampal gyrus, hippocampus, amygdala and fourth tem-
poral gyrus. However, the first to third temporal gyri were rela-
tively spared. The right temporal lobe showed destruction of the 
temporal pole along with the second to fourth temporal gyri. 
There was also damage to the right anterior parahippocampal 
gyrus, but the hippocampus, posterior amygdala and first tempo-
ral gyrus appeared intact (Heywood et al., 1991). An account of 
his amnesia as a result of his visual memory deficit was outlined 
in Greenberg et al. (2005).
Fourteen participants were recruited as control participants 
for patient MS. These consisted of two groups: 10 younger adults 
(two male and eight female) and four older adults (one male and 
three female) matched in age to MS. Younger adults were aged 
between 19 and 31 years (mean (M) = 22.80, standard deviation 
(SD) = 3.79), with 14–21 years of education (M = 16.80, SD = 2.10) 
and were recruited through a participant pool, for which they 
gained course credit. The older adults were aged between 59 and 
63 years (M = 61.00, SD = 1.83), with 9–17 years of education 
(M = 11.75, SD = 3.59, cf. approx. 9–10 years of education for 
patient MS) and were recruited through opportunity sampling 
and were not offered incentives to take part. All participants were 
native English speakers, not presenting with a history of neuro-
logical disease, mental health problems or any drug or alcohol 
dependency. All participants provided informed consent.
Older adults possessed significantly fewer years of education 
compared to younger adults, U = 6.00, z = −1.99, and p = 0.047 
(two-tailed). These older adults were matched with MS based on 
age, t(3) = 2.44 and p = 0.092 (two-tailed).
Episodic simulation task
This task was adapted from Hassabis et al. (2007b). A total of 10 
scenarios were presented to participants who were asked to imag-
ine and describe their experiences. Of those 10 scenarios, four 
were taken from previous experiments (Hassabis et al., 2007b; 
Race et al., 2011) and the other six were designed for this study. 
Scenarios were split into three groups: high-visual (two scenar-
ios), low-visual (six scenarios) and non-visual (two scenarios). 
Instructions for all scenarios were the same and participants were 
guided to include a range of sensory information (visual, audi-
tory, etc.) as well as emotional and spatial information. 
Nonetheless, the scenarios differed in the extent to which each 
might innately cue visual information. High-visual scenarios 
were taken from Hassabis et al. (2007b) and would allow partici-
pants to describe visual stimuli easily (i.e. they allowed for a 
wide variety of visual information to be described). Low-visual 
scenarios implicitly directed participants towards non-visual ele-
ments of a scene (e.g. emotion, sounds, and touch), yet the event 
occurred in the light and visual elements could, therefore, easily 
form part of a coherent experience, even though that visual expe-
rience might be somewhat limited. For example, in a swimming 
pool, the types of visual information are somewhat restricted – 
the experience is inside a room, sightlines are restricted and there 
are fewer visual features, while there are obvious tactile and 
auditory stimuli which feature strongly in most constructions of 
this scenario. Two low-visual scenarios came from Race et al. 
(2011) and three were developed for this experiment. The two 
non-visual scenarios were developed for this experiment to 
accommodate the visual deficits of MS. Both scenarios occurred 
in the dark and therefore explicitly steered participants to using 
non-visual elements of a scene to produce a coherent experience 
(i.e. while visual elements were possible, the darkness meant that 
other sensory elements of the scene were likely to be the domi-
nant feature of such constructions). Each scenario is outlined in 
Table 1.
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete 11 scenarios (10 unique sce-
narios and the first scenario repeated at the end of the experiment 
to explore any performance change). To allow direct comparison 
with patient MS, all older participants and half the younger par-
ticipants were given the same scenarios in the same order as 
patient MS. The remaining five younger participants were given 
the scenarios in a different order to ensure testing order had no 
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role in the results obtained. To control for fatigue, patient MS was 
tested across 3 days, while controls were tested on all scenarios on 
the same day, but with two 10-min breaks after the fifth and tenth 
scenarios, respectively. Although this led to a difference in the 
timescale for testing in patient MS and the control participants, we 
believe that it reduced the chances of control participants planning 
their responses to future sessions in light of previous testing; an 
option not likely in patient MS because of his amnesia.
All participants were tested individually with sessions 
recorded for later transcription and scoring. To begin, partici-
pants were provided with explicit instructions regarding the task 
requirements. The experimenter gave an apparently spontaneous 
example of what an episodic simulation might be like, using the 
example from Hassabis et al. (2007b) which deliberately high-
lights different types of content (e.g. auditory or tactile). As 
patient MS was tested over three sessions and has a memory defi-
cit, this example was repeated at the start of each session. 
Participants were asked whether they understood the instructions 
and what was expected. Once it was verified that participants had 
understood, the test phase began.
For each scenario, the description was read aloud to the par-
ticipant upon which they were instructed to imagine the cued 
situation and describe this in as much detail as possible. 
Participants were instructed to not rely on a previous experience, 
instead creating a new imagined experience. They were also pro-
vided with a printed card placed upon the desk in front of them 
containing the scenario, acting as a reminder should that be 
required. There was no time limit on the length of descriptions, 
with participants being able to finish their description whenever 
they felt nothing else could be added. The interviewer was able to 
probe further into the experiences using a set of clearly defined 
questions for specific situations and which had been previously 
implemented in other experiments (Hassabis et al., 2007b; Race 
et al., 2011) with some modifications, again to account for patient 
MS’s visual deficits. The aim of the probes was to encourage 
further description. For instance, to garner further information 
when poor detail was provided (e.g. ‘Can you imagine anything 
else?’), more specific information on elements of their experi-
ence (e.g. ‘Can you tell me anymore about X?’) or even to 
encourage spatial coherence (e.g. ‘Imagine the whole situation, 
what else is going on?’).
Scoring
The scoring paradigm was the same as that used by Hassabis 
et al. (2007b) except the spatial coherence index was excluded. 
The spatial coherence index requires participants to respond 
about the nature of visualisation on the basis of scenes or objects, 
and it was decided that patient MS’s visual object agnosia would 
interfere with reliable measurement on this scale. Without this 
scale, we were unable to complete the overall experiential index, 
as reported by Hassabis et al. (2007b), but all other components 
of the scale were completed and we therefore report a modified 
experiential index (herein referred to as experiential index) which 
comprises all measures and scoring from Hassabis et al. but with-
out the addition of the spatial coherence index.
Transcripts were scored by the experimenter based on the cri-
teria set out in Hassabis et al. (2007b). For each scenario, content 
analysis was performed on four types of description: sensory 
details; entities present; spatial references; and thoughts, emo-
tions and actions (TEA). Each of these sub-components was 
capped at a maximum score of 7, meaning a total score of 28 
could be achieved. This capped score allowed comparability 
across participants irrespective of the length of their individual 
contributions. Although no verbal fluency measure was taken, 
individuals varied in the length of their responses. However, 
most control participants met or approached the capped score for 
these elements, meaning that differences in response lengths did 
not add variability to the data. Patient MS found the task 
extremely demanding and needed frequent prompting to continue 
his descriptions. In order that excessive prompting did not impact 
results, for all participants, only the information provided after 
the scenario was set and after the first three probes counted 
towards the content score. In addition, unexpectedly patient MS 
failed to be able to provide responses to the non-visual scenarios. 
He was unable to generate even limited description of the sce-
narios and became apparently anxious in attempting to do so. 
Therefore, although both non-visual scenarios were presented to 
patient MS, they were ended quickly and no response recorded.
The scorer provided a score from 0 (devoid of details with no 
sense of experiencing) to 10 (richly detailed and likely emerged 
from a vividly imagined experience). This score was then multi-
plied by 1.8 so that the scale ranged from 0 to 18. As such, the 
Table 1. Episodic simulation scenario type, description and source.
Scenario type Scenario description Source
High-visual Imagine you’re lying on a deserted sandy beach in a beautiful tropical bay Hassabis et al. (2007b)
High-visual Imagine you’re sitting having a drink in a pub Hassabis et al. (2007b)
Low-visual Imagine you are riding your bike up a very steep hill on a hot summer day Designed for this study
Low-visual Imagine catching a niece, nephew, brother or sister you’re babysitting, getting into trouble Race et al. (2011)
Low-visual Imagine that you find out that you’ve won a million pounds in the lottery or at bingo Race et al. (2011) (elements in 
italics are added for this study)
Low-visual Imagine you are leaving a supermarket carrying lots of very heavy shopping. You have to 
walk home and it begins to pour with rain
Designed for this study
Low-visual Imagine you are at a public swimming pool/baths Designed for this study
Low-visual Imagine you are sitting in comfortable chair relaxing while listening to some really good 
music. You close your eyes to enjoy the music
Designed for this study
Non-visual Imagine you are in a dark, dark cave. There is no light so you can’t see anything Designed for this study
Non-visual Imagine you are sleeping at night in a hotel in a city. You wake up in the middle of the 
night and it’s dark in your room and you can’t see anything
Designed for this study
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maximum quality score value was 18. Finally, participants com-
pleted a questionnaire on their self-reported experiences of vivid-
ness, detail, sense of presence, similarity to other memories and 
difficulty of generating the scene for each descriptor. All of these 
were scored on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 5 (e.g. 1 being no 
sense of presence and 5 being a strong feeling of presence). 
However, only vividness and sense of presence were included for 
the experiential index and rescaled from 1–5 to 0–4, meaning an 
additional 8 points could be obtained from these self-report meas-
ures. Therefore, the experiential index score equation is calculated 
by summation of content score (out of 28), richness score (out of 
18) and self-report (out of 8), leading to a maximum value of 54.
Results
Transcriptions of the recordings of all participants were scored 
for content by a single experimenter. All of patient MS’s 
responses and a random sample of four participants’ responses 
(two from the older and two from the younger control groups) 
were also scored by a second experimenter. In line with previous 
studies (e.g. Hassabis et al., 2007a, 2007b), a 2 × 4 analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) (scorer × content measure) showed no main 
effect of scorer (F(1,4) = 1.084, p = 0.36) and no interaction of 
scorer and content type (F(3,12) = 1.790, p = 0.20).
Comparison of control participants
Analyses were undertaken through JASP 0.12.0 (2020). Any null 
results are reported with Bayes Factors (BF10) and computed using 
default priors. For ANOVA, the shape parameter (r) of the prior 
distribution was 0.50, with an r scale covariate of 0.35. For t-tests, 
the Cauchy prior of 0.707 centred at 0 was used. Finally, Kendall’s 
tau-b analysis used the stretched beta prior width of 1. For all anal-
yses, some caution should be taken, given the unbalanced design 
and small sample size (Shaw and Mitchell-Olds, 1993).
A 2 (age group: younger versus older) × 3 (scenario type: 
non-visual, low-visual and high-visual) mixed ANOVA was 
computed to assess differences in experiential index scores in the 
control groups. Due to concerns about sample size causing diffi-
culties with assessing model assumptions, Greenhouse–Geisser 
correction was applied. Omega-squared effect sizes are reported 
with mixed ANOVA to account for the small sample (Albers and 
Lakens, 2018). Post hoc analyses applied Bonferroni–Holm cor-
rection to control for familywise error.
There was a main effect of scenario type, F(1.86,22.31) = 9.11, 
p = 0.002, ω2 = 0.14 with post hoc tests revealing that experiential 
index scores were significantly better in the high-visual 
(M = 43.34, SE = 1.51) compared to the non-visual scenarios 
(M = 36.08, SE = 1.60; p < 0.001). However, there was neither 
significant difference between low-visual (M = 39.64, SE = 1.52) 
and non-visual (p = 0.073, BF10 = 1.06) scenarios nor between 
high-visual and low-visual scenarios, although this was very 
close to significance (p = 0.051, BF10 = 2.15).
No main effect of age was found (F(1,12) = 0.11, p = 0.745, 
ω2 = 0.00, BF10 = 0.49) and there was no interaction between sce-
nario type and age (F(1.86,22.31) = 0.52, p = 0.589, ω2 = 0.00, 
BF10 = 0.43). As age did not show a significant influence on per-
formance, the control data were collapsed into a single group to 
increase statistical power for the remaining analyses.
To assess whether the order in which scenarios were pre-
sented impacted results, younger control participants were tested 
with either the same or a different testing order to patient MS. A 
Welch’s t-test was computed, with Hedges g reported as an effect 
size estimate. Collapsed across all scenario types, it was found 
that there was no significant difference in experiential scores 
between testing the same (M = 41.99, SE = 1.53) or different 
(M = 39.06, SE = 2.02) orders, t(7.46) = 1.16, p = 0.284, g = 0.66, 
BF10 = 0.73. Therefore, all control data were considered together 
irrespective of testing order.
Kendall’s tau-b analyses were computed to assess how perfor-
mance on each scenario type was influenced by perceived task 
difficulty. For all tests, there was no significant correlation 
between perceived difficulty and scenario type performance 
(p ⩾ 0.182, BF10 ⩽ 0.81). There was also no evidence of practise 
effects, with the first (M = 41.50, SE = 1.89) and final (M = 43.96, 
SE = 1.51) scenarios showing no significant difference in their 
experiential index scores, t(13) = 1.39, p = 0.187, d = 0.37, 
BF10 = 0.60.
Comparison of patient MS and control 
participants
When comparing MS and controls, a modified t-test was used 
(Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002, 2005; Crawford and Howell, 
1998); this treats an individual patient’s score as a sample, allow-
ing for comparisons with a control group. Furthermore, a point 
estimate of the average difference, based on classical z-score 
reports, represented as zcc (Crawford et al., 2010) is also reported 
along with 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
Figure 1 shows the performance of controls and patient MS 
across all scenario types. Patient MS showed a clear deficit in com-
parison to controls for both the high (p = 0.001, zcc = −4.31, 95% CI 
(−6.01, −2.58)) and low (p = 0.004, zcc = −3.56, 95% CI (−5.01, 
−2.10)) visual scenarios. However, patient MS did not fulfil the 
criteria for a dissociation between high- and low-visual scenarios, 
Figure 1. Mean experiential index score for each scenario type for 
control participants and patient MS. Patient MS was unable to complete 
the non-visual scenarios and so no data are present. Blue dots 
represent younger age controls and yellow dots represent older age 
controls. Error bars represent 95% CI of mean.
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t(13) = 0.68, p = 0.508, zcc = −0.76, 95% CI (−2.73, 1.14), suggest-
ing an equivalent level of deficit on both scenario types. Patient 
MS did not complete any non-visual scenarios, meaning statistical 
comparison of these scenarios was not possible.
Due to ceiling effects in some of the sub-components of high-
visual scenarios, comparing a breakdown of the sub-components 
was not undertaken. Instead, both the controls and patient MS’s 
data were collapsed into an overall experiential index, ignoring 
scenario type to allow for sub-component analysis. Doing so 
found significant deficits in patient MS’s reporting of sensory 
details (p < 0.001, zcc = −8.27, 95% CI (−11.44, −5.08)), entities 
present (p < 0.001, zcc = −5.14) and TEA (p < 0.001, zcc = −8.51, 
95% CI (−11.78, −5.24)). However, no significant difference was 
observed between patient MS and controls for spatial references, 
t(13) = 1.37, p = 0.194, zcc = −1.42, 95% CI (−2.16, −0.65). These 
comparisons are shown in Figure 2.
For self-report measures, patient MS reported similar scores to 
control participants for perceived task difficulty (p = 0.477, 
zcc = −0.76, 95% CI (−1.35, −0.15)), salience (p = 0.212, 
zcc = −1.36), sense of presence (p = 0.758, zcc = −0.33, 95% CI 
(−0.22, 0.86)) and similarity to previous memories (p = 0.195, 
zcc = −1.42, 95% CI (0.65, 2.15)). However, patient MS did self-
report significantly lower levels of detail in his simulated events 
(p = 0.018, zcc = −2.82, 95% CI (−4.00, −1.62)). In addition, patient 
MS’s quality judgement scores (from experimenter scoring) were 
significantly lower than that of controls (p = 0.003, zcc = −3.69, 
95% CI (−5.18, −2.19)). Therefore, patient MS reports similar 
introspective experiences to control participants for most meas-
ures but shows a lack of detail in his imagined experiences and in 
the quality of his descriptions. Comparisons of patient MS’s 
responses to a scenario can be seen in Figure 3, alongside 
responses to the same scenario from two control participants.
Overall, the data suggest that age likely had little impact on 
performance on the task. Patient MS had severe deficits in imag-
ining fictitious scenes in both high- and low-visual scenarios and 
was unable to complete non-visual scenarios. However, there 
was no dissociation between patient MS’s performance for high 
and low-visual scenarios. Patient MS also showed deficits in 
almost all of the four content elements of the experiential index, 
suggesting that patient MS (similar to other amnesic patients) can 
no longer produce coherent imagined scenes.
Discussion
This study provides the first evidence that a patient with VMDA 
shows significant problems in simulating episodic experiences. 
The mechanism of VMDA is distinctly different to medial tem-
poral lobe (MTL) amnesia in which the hippocampus is at least 
partially intact, but the visual object agnosia leads to problems in 
integrating visual information into anterograde memories 
(Greenberg and Rubin, 2003). Here, in patient MS (a patient with 
visual object agnosia and VMDA; Greenberg et al., 2005), we 
show that there are significant problems in many components of 
episodic simulation.
The finding that age had little impact on performance on this 
task is in stark contrast to the findings of Rendell et al. (2012), 
who showed that older adults has poorer episodic simulation com-
pared to younger adults. It is well documented that with age 
comes cognitive changes, including poorer episodic memory (e.g. 
Morcom and Friston, 2012; for review, see Salthouse, 2009), an 
ability closely tied to episodic simulation (e.g. Hassabis et al., 
2007b; Schacter et al., 2008). However, in this study, the mean 
age of the sample was 61 years, and the evidence shows that below 
the age of 65 years, cognitive decline is not easily detected 
(Salthouse, 2009). Thus, these results do not necessarily contra-
dict the findings of Rendell et al. (2012), but indicate that older 
adults in this research may not be of sufficient age to show detect-
able impairment in the task. As a result, we can also be confident 
that patient MS’s poor performance is not a result of his age alone.
As with his episodic memory (Greenberg et al., 2005), patient 
MS reported his episodic simulation to lack visual and contextual 
detail, making his overall profile highly similar to those of patients 
with MTL amnesia on similar tasks (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis 
et al., 2007b; Race et al., 2011; Rosenbaum et al., 2009). Due to his 
visual object agnosia, we could not assess patient MS on the spatial 
coherence of his episodic simulations. However, patient MS did not 
differ from control participants in self-reported measures of salience, 
sense of presence or similarity to previous memories, though he did 
report a reduced level of detail to his simulations.
Figure 2. Mean sub-component scores across all scenarios for both 
control participants and patient MS. Blue dots represent younger 
age controls and yellow dots represent older age controls. Error bars 
represent 95% CI of mean.
Figure 3. Example of descriptions provided by patient MS, an older 
adult (OA1) and a younger adult (Y12) in response to the same cue.
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Unlike MTL amnesia, MS and other VMDA patients present 
with greater retrograde than anterograde memory deficits 
(Greenberg et al., 2005; Rubin and Greenberg, 1998), with anter-
ograde memories still being produced, though sparse and lacking 
a visual component. As such, the severe lack of retrograde mem-
ories and milder (though still severe) anterograde memory deficit 
may mean patient MS has only relatively recent memories avail-
able to support the simulation of novel episodic experiences. It 
has been argued (e.g. Addis and Schacter, 2012) that when simu-
lating an experience we may rely on available episodic experi-
ences. We might, therefore, expect patient MS to only have 
access to visually restricted episodic reserves because of his 
greater retrograde amnesia. In this case, patient MS would have 
better episodic simulation for events which have less reliance on 
visual information.
It was, therefore, surprising that patient MS showed signifi-
cant anxiety at being asked to produce responses for the non-
visual scenarios (e.g. imagining being in a dark cave), leading to 
him not being able to be tested on these scenarios. Although these 
non-visual scenarios produced lower modified experiential index 
scores for control participants, these scores were not related to 
perceived task difficulty. Therefore, difficulty alone cannot 
explain why patient MS found simulating non-visual scenarios so 
hard. Instead, patient MS’s reliance on his recent store of limited 
episodic experiences may paradoxically drive his simulations 
towards the visual domain. Despite (or perhaps because of) his 
visual object agnosia, patient MS is highly aware of his vision 
and the visual modality of his memories. For example, for the 
scenario of imagining waking in a dark hotel room in the middle 
of the night, he was unable to produce any response. When 
prompted beyond the task to imagine lying there with his eyes 
shut, he responded ‘when I’m awake I have my eyes open all the 
time’. This heightened focus on the visual elements of the world 
means that patient MS’s recent memories (which he is using to 
simulate these episodic events) are primarily visual in nature. 
Episodic memories with less focus on visual elements are likely 
to come from before his visual object agnosia, and therefore fall 
within his severe retrograde amnesia. These memories will there-
fore be unavailable to him for simulating new episodic experi-
ences, leading to this surprising difficulty in simulating non-visual 
scenarios where vision plays little part.
Patient MS’s focus on the visual domain can also be seen in 
the low-visual scenarios. Unlike control participants, patient MS 
shows no difference in performance on these scenarios compared 
to the high-visual scenarios. There are two potential explanations 
for this finding. Patient MS has very impoverished responses to 
all scenarios meaning differences may not be observable because 
of floor effects in his modified experiential index. However, 
beyond this, we see that as for the non-visual scenarios, in these 
low-visual scenarios, patient MS has a tendency to focus on vis-
ual elements of the simulation. For example, by imagining 
cycling up a hill on a hot day (a scenario developed to allow 
focus on elements such as physical exertion, the feeling of sweat 
and the warm sun, etc.) patient MS focuses strongly on several 
visual elements of the scene such as ‘I’m just thinking [about the 
bike] with dropped handlebars’.
Therefore, patient MS has a poor ability to construct such epi-
sodic simulations. When he does construct such simulations, they 
are primarily reliant on a repository of episodic information 
based on relatively recent memories. The lack of visual and con-
textual information within these memories is not, however, 
sufficient to overcome the problems in generating these events as 
control participants do. The lack of episodic memories dating 
before his visual object agnosia also means all his episodic simu-
lations are driven by episodic memories which lack visual infor-
mation. Nonetheless, while these memories lack visual 
information, the visual information that remains is a point of 
focus for patient MS. Therefore, when patient MS does attempt 
episodic simulation the only episodic information available to 
him is lacking visual detail, but he primarily focuses on what 
visual detail remains. The result is that when patient MS is 
directed to construct an episodic simulation which is lacking 
visual information (i.e. the non-visual scenarios), he finds this 
extremely difficult.
It should be considered that the non-visual scenarios which 
patient MS showed so much difficulty do not only differ from 
other scenarios in the nature of the potential visual content. The 
scenarios with lower (or no) visual content were also potentially 
less plausible and less likely to be similar to previous experiences 
of the participant. However, we do not believe this can explain the 
pattern of data that we see. Low likelihood scenarios such as win-
ning a million pounds were in the low-visual scenario condition 
and patient MS did not struggle to respond to these scenarios 
(even though his experiential index scores were poor). In contrast, 
patient MS did not manage to produce a response to non-visual 
scenarios even when they were relatively likely to be related to 
previous experiences (such as waking in a dark hotel room). For 
the same reasons, we believe it unlikely that any potential seman-
tic memory impairment in patient MS as a result of damage to the 
anterior temporal poles can explain the pattern of impairment. It is 
also important to consider the possibility that some scenarios lend 
themselves to scene generation more than others and that this may 
be truer for the non-visual scenarios which patient MS struggled 
most with. However, there is little evidence that these scenarios 
generated poor simulations in any of the control participants; con-
trol participants were able to both report content of these scenes 
and a rich experience for them. Rather, it is most likely the visual 
elements of these scenes which differentiate them on the basis of 
patient MS’s performance.
One other finding of note is that patient MS showed no differ-
ence from control participants in spatial referencing within his epi-
sodic simulations. However, we offer a note of caution here. As can 
be seen in Figure 2, although patient MS is not significantly differ-
ent from controls, his scores are lower, and the variability in perfor-
mance of control participants is greater for this measure than other 
content components of the modified experiential index. Spatial ref-
erences were also the only content component of the score to come 
off ceiling levels in the control participants. We therefore caution 
that this apparent performance within normal limits for patient MS 
may actually reflect surprisingly low performance on this score in 
control participants. This perhaps reflects spatial referencing diffi-
culties in the low-visual and non-visual scenarios used in this task. 
With reduced visual referencing, we cannot be sure that spatial ref-
erencing is not also reduced. Therefore, we cannot be certain from 
these data whether patient MS shows impairments in spatial content 
of these episodic simulations.
These findings demonstrate that a VMDA patient with an 
amnesia arising from the loss of visual inputs to mnemonic shows 
poor performance on episodic simulation tasks. However, the 
presentation of deficits in VMDA remains distinct from the defi-
cits of patients with amnesia as a direct result of damage to the 
hippocampus.
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